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THE ESSENCE OF RAPE 
‘If we can’t say what rape “is”, how can we struggle against it?'1 
What is rape? How do we recognize it? Upon what does a designation of rape depend? Can 
we identify some minimal properties characterizing rape in its many, distinct manifestations?  
Certainly, pronouncements about what is and is not rape, what ought and ought not to count 
as rape, are common enough for us to suppose that, boundary disagreements notwithstanding, 
there is some shared understanding, some essential core, which grounds the concept. The 
basic idea we instantly comprehend: rape is a heinous act inflicting unique, irreparable harm. 
Yet, beneath this surface of shallow consensus lurks deep, unresolved contestation, played 
out repeatedly in the media and popular culture, and manifest too in a vast repository of rape 
scholarship.2 There is wide-ranging debate, for example, about how to characterize rape. Is it 
fundamentally about sex or violence?  Is it a natural (if regrettable) expression of ‘normal’ 
male sexuality or extreme, aberrational conduct? Why is rape regarded as so morally repug-
nant? What exactly is wrong with rape and what sort of harm does it occasion? Are there gra-
dations of rape or does rape entail an ‘all-or nothing’ designation?  How does rape figure in a 
society in which gendered norms and disparities remain deeply embedded?  
                                                 
1
 AJ Cahill, Rethinking Rape (Cornell UP 2001) 9. 
2
 The literature on rape is voluminous; key texts on which this analysis draws include S Brownmiller, Against 
our Will: Men, Women and Rape (Penguin 1975); S Tomaselli and R Porter (eds), Rape: a Historical and Social 
Enquiry, (Blackwell 1986); K Burgess-Jackson (ed), A Most Detestable Crime: New Philosophical Essays on 
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Scaffolding of Rape (Routledge 2005).  
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The contentiousness of these questions evidences the striking lack of consensus infusing rape 
discourse.3 Once probed, the idea of rape proves surprisingly elusive. Yet, public debate rou-
tinely bypasses the discursive fragility of rape, presupposing a stable, uncontested core of 
meaning unaffected by disagreement at the penumbra. This is culturally reproduced in ap-
peals to ‘real’,4 ‘legitimate’,5 or ‘classic’ rape,6 positing a prototypical ideal to assess the 
‘rape-ness’ of specific encounters.7 The assumption that rape is a self-evidently meaningful 
term - that ‘rape is rape’8 - constantly jars with the practical and political irresolution charac-
terizing the discourse. Put simply, if perceptions of rape vary so extensively, how can it 
properly signify a shared understanding around which public debate may be conducted? 
The academic solution is to devise a theory with sufficient explanatory and/or normative po-
tency; to construct an account offering ‘the best understanding of the constellation of acts we 
conceptualize as rape’.9 The result is a plethora of theoretical engagements, spanning disci-
plines and diverging markedly in form, focus, and standpoint. While, such multi-disciplinary 
engagement reflects the importance of rape as a focus of intellectual enquiry, it is less condu-
cive to harmonious theoretical alignment. Because most rape theories emanate from within a 
disciplinary frame, the choice of frame inevitably influences the analysis which results, gen-
erating a series of parallel, often discordant, narratives and a discursive environment in which 
                                                 
3
 ‘Rape discourse’ denotes the myriad significations / representations of rape in ordinary language, law, public 
debate, philosophy, art etc, encompassing conceptual structures, ideological frameworks, institutional practices, 
and other linguistic and non-linguistic processes of knowledge creation, configuration, and authentication.           
4
 J Temkin and B Krahé, Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude (Hart 2008) 31-33. 
5
 See comments of US Senate candidate, Todd Akin, on the unlikelihood of pregnancy in cases of ‘legitimate 
rape’ (‘Todd Akin defiant as support withdrawn over “legitimate rape” claims’, The Guardian 20 August 2012).  
6
 See remarks of British politician, Kenneth Clarke, describing ‘classic rape’ as ‘where someone jumps out from 
behind a bush’ (‘Ken Clarke is wrong on rape – but many seem to agree with him’, Duncan Robertson, The New 
Statesman, 18 May 2011). 
7
 Prefacing descriptors before ‘rape’ may also signal departures from or qualifications to a prototypical ideal, eg 
‘date rape’ / ‘marital rape’.  
8
 Barack Obama, reported in The Huffington Post, 20 August 2012 (http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/2012/08/20/obama-todd-akin-rape_n_1812140.html). 
9
 JH Bogart, ‘Reconsidering Rape: Rethinking the Conceptual Foundations of Rape Law’ (1995) 8 Can J L & 
Jurisprudence 159, 160. 
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understandings of rape are ‘splintered, broken up, diffracted’ amidst a proliferation of author-
itative voices.10 
Is it possible to reduce the discord marking the field? Can we identify some core principles, 
isolate key properties, agree some basic normative stakes upon which a coherent articulation 
of rape might rest? Is there an essence of rape to be distilled, pure and unadulterated, from the 
bewildering medley of views populating the discursive frame? We could turn to law and posit 
that rape is, and only is, what the law decrees: a designation of rape is the product not of phil-
osophical speculation or anthropological enquiry but doctrinal precision. This approach has 
some merit: After all, rape, strictly speaking, is a legal concept; and although law cannot cap-
ture exhaustively what might be regarded as sexual wrongdoing, it is surely conclusive on the 
question of whether and what conduct amounts to rape.  
The problem is that while law can settle the question of what rape currently is, it can do little 
to resolve the question of what rape ought to be. And unless the ‘ought’ question is ad-
dressed, appealing to law defers rather than determines most of the concerns animating rape 
debate. Moreover, as HLA Hart, amongst others, pointed out, legal concepts are rarely as de-
terminate as we imagine. Because language is open-textured, even the clearest of rules re-
quires interpretation.11 Nor is language a neutral vehicle for expressing ideas: language is so-
cially and culturally encoded, embedded in institutional settings, and actively implicated in 
representational and meaning-making processes.12 For example, the traditional common law 
articulation of rape – to have ‘carnal knowledge with any woman… against her will’13 - has 
                                                 
10
 N Bryson, ‘Two Narratives of Rape in the Visual Arts: Lucretia and the Sabine Women’ in Tomaselli and 
Porter (n 2) 152, 153. 
11
 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press 1961) especially Ch VII.  
12
 S Ehrlich, Representing Rape: Language and Sexual Consent (Routledge 2001). 
13
  M Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae [History of the Pleas of the Crown] 2 vols (London Professional 
Books Limited 1971) vol 1, 628 (originally published 1736).  
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long served as a linguistic proxy for the assumptions and beliefs of a succession of  male ju-
ristic communities about sexual matters. While reforms in recent decades have produced con-
temporary definitions in which allusions to ‘carnal knowledge’ have yielded to more explicit 
articulation of acts and body parts,14 there remains considerable scope for injecting social and 
cultural ideas about sexuality into the legal framework. Temkin and Krahé speculate that no 
other criminal offence ‘is as intimately related to broader social attitudes’ as rape.15 Such atti-
tudes seep into the fabric of legal discourse, shaping legal and moral deliberation. Juries too 
are influenced by ideas about rape going well beyond the formal doctrinal categories,16 all of 
which troubles an understanding of rape as purely and inviolably legal. 
Recent law reform initiatives have further destabilized rape as a meaningful category. As 
feminist concerns infiltrate policy discourse, a transformative impetus has swept the globe,17 
producing a discursive platform in which traditionally held views have been challenged and 
formal definitions radically revised. In England and Wales, the common law definition was 
statutorily superseded in 1976 by a more detailed elaboration of rape as ‘unlawful sexual in-
tercourse with a woman who at the time of intercourse does not consent, the man knowing 
she does not consent or being reckless as to whether she does’.18 Further revision followed in 
1994 when 'sexual intercourse' was expanded to include anal as well as vaginal penetration, 
                                                 
14
 Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 1(1) (considered further below). 
15
 Temkin and Krahé (n 4) 33.   
16
 L Ellison and V Munro, ‘Of “Normal Sex” and “Real Rape: Exploring the Use of Socio-sexual Scripts in 
(Mock) Jury Deliberation’ (2009) 18/3 Social & Legal Studies 1; ead, ‘Better the devil you know: “real rape” 
stereotypes and the relevance of a previous relationship in (mock) juror deliberations’ (2013) 14 International 
Journal of Evidence and Proof 299. 
17
 Useful cross-jurisdictional analyses include C McGlynn and V Munro (eds), Rethinking Rape Law: Interna-
tional and Comparative Perspectives (Routledge 2010); N Westmarland and G Gangoli (eds) International Ap-
proaches to Rape Law (Polity Press 2011). 
18
 Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, amending the Sexual Offences Act 1956 which, while recognizing 
rape as a statutory offence (s 1), offered no definition so that the common law understanding continued to gov-
ern. Some aspects of rape law were statutorily enshrined before 1976, eg sex with a minor (‘statutory rape’). See 
generally K Burgess-Jackson, ‘A History of Rape Law’ in Burgess-Jackson (n 2) 15.  
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thus encompassing male rape.19  In 2003, following a comprehensive Home Office Review,20 
significant additional changes were enacted, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 offering the most 
explicit statutory account of rape in England and Wales to date:  
‘1 (1) A person (A) commits an offence if—  
(a) he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person (B) with his penis,  
(b) B does not consent to the penetration, and  
(c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents.’  
This new articulation replaced the concept of recklessness in the 1976 Act with a standard of 
reasonable belief in consent,21 introducing a general definition of consent22 supported by evi-
dentiary presumptions in prescribed circumstances.23 The term ‘sexual intercourse’ was 
dropped in favour of an anatomical formulation so that for the first time English legislation 
was explicit about requiring a penis to commit rape.24 More broadly, the Act radically re-
structured sexual offences to comprise four core categories: rape (s 1), assault by penetration 
(s 2), sexual assault (s 3) and causing a person to engage in sexual activity without their con-
sent (s 4). This conveyed a legislative logos in which rape was distinguished from other 
forms of sexual violation and located at the top of the sexual offences hierarchy.25  
                                                 
19
 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s 142, amending SOA 1956, s 1. 
20
 Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the Law of Sexual Offences, Vol 1 (HO 2000). 
21
 Ending the controversial reign of DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182.  
22
 SOA 2003 s 74: ‘A person consents if he agrees by choice and has the freedom and capacity to make that 
choice’. 
23
 SOA 2003 ss 75 and 76.   
24
 See also SOA 2003 s 78, defining ‘sexual’ and s 79 defining ‘penetration’. Previous statutory elaborations 
incorporated the penis requirement implicitly by using gender-specific language (‘man’, ‘woman’ etc). 
25
 A hierarchical conception of sexual offences is reflected in the prescribed penalties as well as in legislative 
debate. See eg House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, Sexual Offences Bill, Fifth Report of Session 
2002-2003, HC 639, paras 11-12; Sexual Offences Bill: Government Reply to Fifth Report from the Home Af-
fairs Select Committee 2002-2003 HC 639 (Cm 5986, October 2003) para 1. 
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Debate in England and Wales about what kinds of conduct should fall within the contours of 
rape is emblematic of wider, multi-jurisdictional interrogation of the traditional parameters of 
the crime,26 further propelled by international law developments in which the association of 
rape with group-based forms of coercion has come more clearly to the fore.27 It is increas-
ingly acknowledged that perceptions of rape are changing (some argue, quite dramatically28). 
Certainly, the marked increase in the number of rapes reported29 suggests either that the inci-
dence of rape has risen exponentially or that views as to its scope are undergoing significant 
change. Some commentators maintain that the ambit of rape is now too wide: ‘rape’ is being 
dangerously ‘diluted’30 and/or unduly extended ‘into the realms of sexual etiquette’.31 Others 
think the global shift away from conceiving rape as sex by force towards conceiving it as 
nonconsensual sex better reflects contemporary moral and cultural values in which rape is in-
creasingly aligned with the protection of sexual autonomy, understood as the right to self-
governance in matters of sexuality.32  
Tension between competing conceptions of rape is also visible in debate about rape convic-
tion rates. For some, the fact that the number of rape convictions has remained relatively 
static despite the steep rise in rapes being reported, is indicative of a ‘justice gap’ when it 
                                                 
26
 Scottish rape law has changed along similar lines. See Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 and S Cowan, 
‘All Change or Business as Usual? Reforming the Rape Law of Scotland’ (McGlynn and Munro (n 17) 154). 
27
 See especially the decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Akayesu (ICTR-96-
4-T, Judgment 2 September 1998), considered further below. 
28
 Gavey (n 2). 
29
 Domestic figures reveal an unprecedented rise in the number of rapes reported over the last few decades 
(Temkin and Krahé (n 4) 14). For a statistical breakdown by force and year, see www.justiceinspec-
torates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/publications/rape-monitoring-group-digests-and-data-2015-16.  
30
 K Roiphe, The Morning After: Sex, Fear and Feminism on Campus (Little, Brown and Co 1993) 81. 
31
 L Gittos, Why Rape Culture is a Dangerous Myth (Imprint Academic 2015) ch 4. 
32 See eg Schulhofer (n 2). For an argument against sexual autonomy as the underlying principle of rape law, see 




comes to rape victims.33  For others, the statistics are evidence that the system is working 
well, that only ‘real’ rapes are making the legal cut.34 Disagreement about what can be in-
ferred from rape conviction statistics is complicated by limitations in the range and compati-
bility of available data.35 Nevertheless, it is plain that disagreement about the scope of rape is 
now deeply entangled in public policy debate on criminal justice matters.  
Rape is a maelstrom of conceptual and normative contestation, a ‘category in crisis’.36 The 
term is apparently so devoid of shared social and cultural meaning as to question its fitness 
for purpose.  Has the time come to eschew rape as a term, to look afresh at questions of sex-
ual wrongdoing unencumbered by the ideological baggage it imports? This approach is not 
without precedent. The 1970s and 1980s witnessed a trend away from rape as a formal legal 
category towards more generic formulations premised upon violence and/or sexual miscon-
duct.37 Changes in nomenclature however did not necessarily produce improvements on the 
ground.38 Whether framed in terms of rape or sexual assault/battery/misconduct, legal ap-
proaches to sexual violence continue to be widely criticized for failing victims. Moreover, 
even in jurisdictions where ‘rape’ has been formally abolished, the term still retains cultural 
                                                 
33
 See, eg Temkin and Krahé (n 4); V Munro and L Kelly, ‘A Vicious Cycle: Attrition and Conviction Patterns 
in Contemporary Rape Cases in England and Wales’ in M Horvath and J Brown (eds) Rape: Challenging Con-
temporary Thinking (Willan 2009) 281.   
34
 Gittos (n 31) ch 1.  
35
 Stern Review: A Report by Baroness Vivien Stern CBE of an Independent Review into how Rape Complaints 
are handled by Public Authorities in England and Wales (Home Office and Government Equalities Office 2010) 
42-46. 
36
 P Rush, ‘Jurisdictions of Sexual Assault: Reforming the Texts and Testimony of Rape in Australia’ (2011) 19 
Feminist Legal Studies 47, 48.  
37
 See eg the Michigan reforms introduced in the 1970s to regulate ‘criminal sexual misconduct’ (considered in 
Burgess-Jackson (n 18) 21-24) as well as the ‘sexual assault’ framework introduced in Canada in 1983 (J Rob-
erts and R Mohr (eds) Confronting Sexual Assault: A Decade of Legal Change (University of Toronto Press 
1994)). On Australian reforms, see Rush (n 36). 
38
 Schulhofer (n 2) ch 2. 
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and political purchase, expressing a need to signal the distinctiveness of rape, the special and 
unique status it holds as a focus of moral, political, and social concern.39  
At which point we return to the nub of the question: what is this distinctiveness, this special 
status, this uniqueness? What makes rape rape and not otherwise?  This looks like a question 
of essence. Essence is closely associated with efforts to identify and differentiate things, and 
distinguishing rape from non-rape is surely a central preoccupation of rape discourse. It 
would be surprising, therefore, not to find essence implicated in some way and one does not 
have to look far to detect the operation of an essential or paradigmatic rape (however elusive) 
serving as a conceptual theoretical, or ideological lynchpin. This is not to assert that there is 
an essence of rape to be extracted from the morass of contestation but rather to recognize that 
rape discourse frequently operates as if there is. Assuming this hypothesis is correct, close 
investigation of how essence is discursively deployed may well aid our understanding of, and 
enhance our ability to respond to, the complex array of practical and political difficulties 
which rape, and rape law, currently pose. In the analysis which follows, I pursue this line of 
thought to mount a comprehensive critique of the role of essence in rape discourse. I argue 
that reliance on essence promotes an understanding of rape as static and universal, insensitive 
to historical, cultural, and spatial specificities; a continuity of meaning and commonality of 
understanding is projected which is more misleading than enlightening. I encourage instead 
an apprehension of rape as politically contested and contextually bound, shifting the focus 
away from abstract speculation about what rape is, towards honest, creative, and constructive 
engagement with the role of law in regulating sexual misconduct. 
 
                                                 
39
 The policy literature is peppered with references to the ‘uniqueness’ of rape. See eg L Kelly, J Lovett and L 
Regan, A Gap or a Chasm? Attrition in Reported Rape Cases (Home Office Research Study 293 2005); Stern 
Review (n 35); Dame Elish Angiolini, Report of the Independent Review into the Investigation and Prosecution 
of Rape in London (CPS 2015).   
9 
ESSENCE TALK 
It is not uncommon to frame accounts of rape in terms of essence.  PJ Fitzgerald asserts that 
‘the essence of rape and similar offences is that the accused takes sexual liberties with a 
woman against her will’.40 According to Setting the Boundaries, ‘the essence of rape’ is ‘the 
sexual penetration of a person …without consent’.41 For Nicola Lacey, ‘its essence lies in the 
violation of sexual autonomy.’42 John Bogart invokes ‘the essential harm’ of rape,43 while 
Louise du Toit refers to the ‘damage’44 and George Panichas to the ‘wrong’45 of rape in ex-
pressly essentialist terms.  Judges too often talk about rape – indeed about legal categories in 
general - in terms of essence: In DPP v Morgan, Lord Hailsham identifies intent as an ‘essen-
tial ingredient’ of rape46 while, in R v Miller, Lynskey J describes consent in similar terms.47  
Even when not explicitly invoked, essence may function implicitly to underpin discursive en-
gagement, particularly where the concern is to analyse conceptual boundaries or interrogate 
core meanings. For Aristotle, most closely associated with essence philosophically, the idea 
of essence was intimately connected with substance or being.  He used the Greek phrase ‘to ti 
en einai’ (‘what it is to be that thing’) and it is from his early metaphysics that essence 
emerged as a philosophical category, specifically as a conceptual vehicle for articulating what 
things are, including intangibles such as ‘law’ or ‘justice’.48 Because essence is deeply bound 
                                                 
40
 PJ Fitzgerald, Criminal Law and Punishment (OUP 1962) 74. 
41
 (n 20) para 2.8.2. 
42
 N Lacey, ‘Unspeakable Subjects, Impossible Rights: Sexuality, Integrity and Criminal Law’ (1998) 11 Can J 
L & Jurisprudence 47, 59. 
43
 Bogart (n 9) 170. 
44
 Du Toit (n 2) 6. 
45
 G Panichas, ‘Simple Rape and the Risks of Sex’ (2006) 25 Law and Philosophy 613, 622.  
46
 (n 21) at 215. 
47
 R v Miller [1954] QBD 282 per Lynskey J at 285. Other examples include Lord Nimmo-Smith in Lord-Advo-
cate’s Reference (No 1 of 2001) [2002] SCCR 435 at 461, considering whether force is ‘an essential element in 
the crime of rape’ and overruling HM Advocate v Sweenie (Charles) (1858) 3 Irv 109 in which Lord Cowan 
states: ‘it is the essence of the crime of rape that carnal knowledge of the woman's person should be had, forci-
bly, and without her consent’ (at 143).  
48
 Aristotle, Metaphysics (Penguin Classics) (1998) Z4. 
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up with questions of meaning and definition, almost any exploration of ideas or concepts will 
veer in its path. Essence diverts attention away from particular manifestations of a thing to-
wards features which persist across time and endure through processes of change. It offers a 
way to bypass temporal and spatial specificities, to get beyond the debilitating details of nor-
mative and conceptual contestation, promising an articulation capable of transcending all oth-
ers.  
In philosophical discourse, essence is a highly technical concept featuring prominently in the 
fields of logic, metaphysics, and linguistic philosophy. Outside these contexts, essence is un-
derstood less strictly and more diversely so that correspondence between philosophical artic-
ulations and popular usages is loose at best; indeed, some of the ways in which essence is 
culturally apprehended are likely to be viewed, philosophically speaking, as distortions of the 
idea of essence properly understood. This is not always appreciated by those who wield es-
sence as a discursive tool. Recognizing this, the analysis here sacrifices philosophical purity 
and adopts an ‘ordinary language’ approach49 to probe the myriad ways in which essence fig-
ures, explicitly and implicitly, in rape discourse. Four common understandings of essence are 
posited: ‘necessary’, ‘positional’, ‘pure’, and ‘real’ essence. Each exemplifies a distinct, al-
beit related, linguistic use of the term, although in practical contexts the categories are not al-
ways easily distinguishable: Multiple understandings of essence may be deployed simultane-
ously, synonymously, and/or interdependently. The proffered typology thus functions heuris-
tically as an explanatory tool to be approached with due caution regarding the methodological 
risks which accompany the construction and application of ‘ideal types’, in particular, the risk 
                                                 
49
 On ordinary language philosophy, see F Lynd, ‘Oxford and the “Epidemic” of Ordinary Language Philoso-
phy’ (2001) 84 Monist 325. Hart’s Concept of Law is a prime example of the application of ordinary language 
philosophy to law. 
11 
of reifying - rendering ‘real’ - abstract theoretical contrivances devised for analytical pur-
poses.     
 
NECESSARY ESSENCE 
Perhaps the most common understanding of essence in popular usage attributes essential 
properties to something. Described by Forbes as an ‘intuitive’ understanding in which ‘the 
essence of the thing is the collection of features which determine its identity and make it the 
specific thing it is rather than something else’,50 the conceptual separation of entities from 
their properties provides a means of identifying and distinguishing things. Essential proper-
ties are necessary properties which cannot be relinquished without loss of the thing itself. 
They are distinguishable from accidental properties, properties which something happens to 
have, might commonly possess, but are not necessary to its being. Swans for example, while 
commonly white, can sometimes be black. Whiteness therefore is an accidental not essential 
property of a swan.51  
The accidental/essential distinction, while intuitively easy to grasp, is difficult to pin down 
philosophically and views diverge widely on how the distinction should be drawn.52 It is easy 
to fall into the ‘dangerous trap’53 of mistaking accidental for essential properties. It is equally 
mistaken to assume that universal properties are always also essential: A sexual division of 
labour may well be a universal feature of human societies but this does not make it essential 
in the sense that no human society could do without it. Although closely associated, essence 
                                                 
50
 G Forbes, ‘Essentialism’ in B Hale and C Wright (eds) A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (Black-
well Publishing 1999) 515, 516. 
51
 ibid 515. 
52
 ibid; see also S Roca-Royes, ‘Essential Properties and Individual Essences’ (2011) 6/1 Philosophy Compass 
65. 
53
 J Roland Martin, ‘Methodological Essentialism, False Differences and Other Dangerous Traps’ (1993) 19/3 
Signs 630, 632. 
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and universality are not synonymous: while essential features are necessarily universal to the 
category they belong, universal features are not necessarily essential. A similar point applies 
to generalization. We can generalize - extrapolate from experience or draw upon a repre-
sentative sample - without necessarily making an essence claim. Of course, the generalization 
may turn out to be false or unsustainable but to expose a false generalization is not neces-
sarily to challenge the concept of essence per se.54  
Necessary essence is frequently encountered in law. The jurisprudential quest to delineate a 
domain of law invites the articulation of essential properties which capture what law is and 
ground it as a meaningful category.55 Essence also functions as a doctrinal tool: The reduc-
tion of legal concepts to bundles of necessary properties is a common legal technique. In 
many ways, the traditional methodology of legal scholarship, entailing the abstraction of core 
elements from the clutter and chaos of practical legal disagreement, is essence talk writ large. 
Essence here is closely linked to processes of categorization. Identifying common attributes 
allows distinct entities to be grouped in terms of kind.56 For example, the four core offences 
comprising the sexual offences framework in England and Wales may be classified as a sin-
gle kind of offence premised on nonconsensual sexual acts.57 Essence here works to signal 
sameness across difference, conferring unity upon otherwise fragmented phenomena.   
What then are the necessary properties of rape? What makes rape ‘the specific thing it is and 
not something else’58? Doctrinally speaking, rape, like any legal category, is easily reducible 
                                                 
54
 According to Martin, the feminist critique of gender essentialism has largely been concerned with attacking 
false generalizations which have become confused with claims about essence (ibid, 644-645).  
55
 See eg J Raz, ‘Can There be a Theory of Law’ in M Golding & W Edmundson (eds) The Blackwell Guide to 
the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Blackwell 2004) 324.  
56
 In The Metaphysics of Gender (OUP 2011)), Charlotte Witt distinguishes ‘kind essentialism’ from ‘individual 
essentialism’, the former relating to those features which identify a thing as belonging to a particular kind, the 
latter being concerned with features which confer individual identity or unity. Both understandings rely on a no-
tion of necessary properties.  
57
 Setting the Boundaries (n 20) para. 2.1.1.  
58
 Forbes (n 50).  
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to a bundle of necessary ingredients. The contents of the bundle will vary jurisdictionally: 
rape does not always require a penis, include anal or oral penetration, require proof of physi-
cal force and so on. Inevitably, disagreements will arise about what the bundle ought to com-
prise at which point attention shifts towards identifying some minimally recurring, multi-ju-
risdictional feature(s) capable of uniting rape as a generic category.  
Could lack of consent serve such a unifying purpose? In a lengthy, multi-jurisdictional over-
view of rape law reform, the European Court of Human Rights in MC v Bulgaria59 highlights 
lack of consent as the key point of convergence in modern rape law. Rape becomes recast, 
simply and essentially, as nonconsensual sex.60 Others, however, question whether consent 
provides the glue holding rape law together. Historically, and to some extent contemporane-
ously, consent is not always legally determinative.61 Moreover, it is generally the perpetra-
tor’s perception of whether it has been given, rather than the fact of consent, which delineates 
the scope of the offence. Consent may be withheld, but if the perpetrator believes, honestly 
and/or reasonably (depending on whether an objective or subjective legal test governs) that it 
has been given, rape is not deemed to have occurred. Strictly speaking then, rape is not non-
consensual sex but sex where the defendant knows or ought to know (again, depending on the 
                                                 
59
 (39278/98) [2003] ECHR 646 (4 December 2003). 
60
 See ibid, in particular at [127] where the Court refers to rape as an offence against women’s autonomy, the 
‘essential element’ of which is lack of consent.  
61
 Statutory rape provides one example here, the marital rape exemption, another. While in both contexts, con-
sent is woven into the conceptual structure - the underage child is deemed by law to be incapable of giving her 
consent and the married woman is deemed by law to be incapable of withdrawing it - the notion of consent is 
formal and legally constituted rather than derived from the victim’s state of mind. At the very least, this is a dif-
ferent kind of consent from that endorsed in MC v Bulgaria and indeed most consent theories.  
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test applied) that consent is lacking. Add to this the well-documented practical problems as-
sociated with proving lack of consent and there emerges a significant category of nonconsen-
sual sexual encounters likely to fall outside the parameters of legal proscription.62 
If consent does not necessarily correspond with rape conceptually or practically, nor does it 
normatively. Catharine MacKinnon maintains that consent misdiagnoses the problem of rape 
as ‘unwanted, rather than unequal sex’.63 MacKinnon, among other commentators,64 ques-
tions the practicability of consent to sex in a society in which power disparities remain so vis-
ibly gendered, ‘Lack of consent’ she argues ‘is redundant and should not be a separate ele-
ment of [rape]’.65 Rape should be defined as ‘sex by compulsion’,66 placing coercion not con-
sent at the heart of the conceptual framework. To exemplify this approach, MacKinnon in-
vokes the judgment in Akayesu where rape is defined as ‘as a physical invasion of a sexual 
nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive’.67 In Akayesu, the 
(external) conditions of coercion rather than the (internal) presence or absence of consent are 
the primary evidentiary and doctrinal foci. Although devised in an international criminal law 
context, MacKinnon advocates the broader application of Akayesu,68 adapting it to craft a 
‘transnational’ redefinition of rape69 which dispenses with consent entirely.       
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MacKinnon includes fraud within her expanded definition of coercion. By contrast, Rubenfeld argues that fraud 
properly features as a factor in consent and that legal reluctance to recognize rape-by-deception proves that 
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Which model - consent or coercion - confers upon rape the clearest conceptual boundaries? 
Which has the widest scope? Much depends here on how coercion and consent are under-
stood. Conceived narrowly and traditionally in terms of physical force, coercion yields an un-
derstanding of rape which excludes many nonconsensual sexual encounters. In this context, a 
consent-based model is obviously more expansive than a force- or coercion-based one.70  
However, a broader understanding of force/coercion yields a correspondingly broader of-
fence. Burgess-Jackson, for example, advocates an idea of coercion going beyond physical 
force (or the threat thereof) to include situations in which perpetrators create conditions 
which render victims vulnerable, enabling the exploitation of that vulnerable state (what Bur-
gess-Jackson describes as cases of  ‘manipulated-vulnerability’).71 His approach recognizes 
that, even under threat, people make choices, but because such choices are constrained by 
conditions imposed by the threat-maker, they should not be permitted to legitimate sexual en-
counters. Like MacKinnon, Burgess-Jackson supports a model of rape in which coercion is 
central and choice/consent play no formal or direct role. However, MacKinnon’s conception 
of coercion is wider still; for MacKinnon one cannot easily separate rape from the broader 
context of gender inequality generating an element of coercion in virtually all heterosexual 
                                                 
force not consent is the normative lynchpin of US rape law. Such diverging apprehensions of how fraud/decep-
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encounters.72 The difficulty then becomes that coercion, so broadly conceived, struggles to 
devise a clear boundary between rape and ‘ordinary sexual intercourse’.73  
The risk of dissolving the rape/sex boundary in an all-encompassing concept of coercion has 
prompted calls to retain and reinvigorate consent.74 Many also view consent as a more agent-
centered model which too broad a concept of coercion tends to deny.75 However, instead of a 
negative conception of consent framed in terms of its absence, a more positive conception is 
advocated in which the parties mutually agree.76 There are undeniable practical difficulties 
with requiring formal affirmation in sexual encounters77 (although this has been possible in 
other legal contexts).78 Stressing the need positively to affirm one’s agreement to sex also has 
the theoretical merit of highlighting an unarticulated presumption underpinning most rape 
laws, namely that sexual intercourse is presumed to be consensual unless proven otherwise.79 
If one were to start from the premise that sexual intercourse is not consensual unless and until 
positive evidence of consent is adduced,80 our conception of rape would look very different. 
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What this reverse imaginary reveals is precisely the situatedness of rape law within a broader 
cultural context of heterosexual norms and liberal values which together sustain a conception 
of sexual intercourse as a positive, natural encounter engendering minimal interpersonal obli-
gations.81 This default cultural presumption is rarely challenged;82 yet the benign nature of 
coitus is far from self-evident, particularly when viewed from a female risk perspective.83             
More importantly, the cultural embeddedness of rape and its normative investment in a par-
ticular conception of sexual relations is difficult to reconcile with any formal articulation of 
essential properties abstracted from the context and conditions in which they apply. A for-
malistic approach is thus likely to yield an impoverished account of the operational parame-
ters of the concept. The business of reducing rape to a bundle of necessary properties starts to 
look more complicated than first thought, certainly when the focus moves beyond the articu-
lation of doctrinal requirements towards a more generic, normatively grounded understand-
ing. Even lack of consent, surely the intuitive front-runner, does not easily or unequivocally 
qualify as a necessary or indispensable feature. Lack of consent may be a sufficiently com-
mon element of rape conceptualizations to encourage a tendency to generalize about rape in 
such terms but such generalizations lack the ontological power of essence claims and do not 
pull such normative weight.   
One is tempted to conclude that rape has no essence, that rape is simply whatever the label 
‘rape’ happens to be attached.  Before settling on this conclusion however, it is worth consid-
ering whether a different idea of essence is in play.  
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An associated understanding of essence operates in ordinary language. It calls upon essence 
to ascribe value or normative weight, often drawing on spatial metaphors to position essence, 
for example, at the centre (core, heart) or base (foundation, bottom) of something. The use of 
positional essence signifies importance by instituting a rank order of identifying features. To 
say that the essence of law is justice, or the essence of love forgiveness, is to make a claim 
about the preeminence of one feature of a thing (justice /forgiveness) over others. While ne-
cessity is generally implied here it is not directly the concern. Rather the focus is on con-
structing (or revealing) a hierarchy among features inhering in a thing. 84  
As with necessary essence, positional essence engages with questions of identity. It does this 
by accentuating that feature of identity perceived most closely - or essentially - to capture 
what something is. When Dicey declares that unlimited parliamentary authority is ‘the very 
essence of the English Constitution’,85 he is foregrounding what he regards to be a fundamen-
tal feature of English constitutionalism.  Similarly, when Dror Wahrman, remarks upon an 
emerging cultural tendency in eighteenth century England to view maternity as ‘the essence 
of femininity’,86 he is deploying essence to privilege one feature of femininity (maternity) 
with greater consequence than others. Essence here assumes an aspirational quality, enabling 
it to operate as a regulatory norm. Indeed, it is this understanding of essence which is at the 
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heart of the feminist critique of gender essentialism. To assert, for example, that women ap-
ply an ‘ethic of care’ to moral deliberations87 is to promote a normative ideal of nurturing 
womanhood. Sometimes too a teleological element comes into play, as when women’s repro-
ductive capacities become aligned with essential womanhood: Because reproduction is what 
women are for, it is deemed to be quintessentially expressive of what they are.88 
Positional essence often surfaces in discursive contestation. It provides a way of ‘controlling, 
regulating, and policing’89 debate through a process of normative weighting in which certain 
features, values, or concerns emerge as dispositive. Appeals to essence taking this form do 
not always do so explicitly. Essentialist assumptions are often mobilized unconsciously 
and/or unreflectively so that their architectural role in discursive exchange goes unnoticed 
and unchallenged. This is one way of apprehending the operation of the ‘real rape’ stereo-
type. A stereotype, understood as ‘a widely held but fixed and oversimplified image or idea 
of a particular type of person or thing’ (OED), is not synonymous with an essence but the two 
concepts are closely connected; stereotypes often rely on essentialist assumptions and beliefs, 
for example, ascribing certain natural and immutable properties to socially constructed cate-
gories/groups.90 The ‘real rape’ stereotype invokes an understanding of rape in which certain 
features – the presence of violence, the absence of a prior relationship between victim and 
perpetrator, the public nature of the location (park, alleyway) - are thought to be especially 
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indicative of the offence.  Many rape commentators contend that the stereotype operates pre-
scriptively to shape police investigations and rape trials.91 The identification of a ‘typical’ 
rape scenario means that the conceptual parameters of rape become constrained by a paradig-
matic norm against which other instantiations are weighted and assessed. Cultural invoca-
tions of ‘real rape’ thus rely on essentialist constructions of rape in much the same way as 
cultural appeals to femininity rely on essentialist constructions of gender. Importantly, how-
ever, the notion of essence in play is positional, not necessary. As Helen Reece observes, the 
‘real rape’ stereotype is rarely invoked definitionally,92 that is, to prescribe necessary proper-
ties or set minimum conditions of identification; but it does function discursively, providing a 
normative paradigm which structures rape debate. Nor is the influence of the real rape stereo-
type dependent upon its explicit endorsement: stereotypes too often influence unconsciously 
to instill implicit biases which inform evaluative judgments.93 One cannot therefore dismiss 
the continued purchase of the real rape stereotype, simply on the grounds that fewer people 
consciously subscribe to it.94      
The long-running debate over whether to conceptualize rape in terms of sex or violence pre-
sents another useful context for exploring how positional essence works. In the 1970s, Susan 
Brownmiller led feminist calls for a construction of rape as ‘a hostile and degrading act of vi-
olence’.95 This perspective found favour with feminist law reform advocates96 who hoped 
that by recasting rape as a crime of violence, it would be taken more seriously as a harm. The 
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judiciary too welcomed the rape-as-violence paradigm, happy to endorse the notion that ‘rape 
has nothing to do with sex and everything to do with anger and power’.97 The focus on vio-
lence encouraged gender-neutral legal articulations in which violent sexual intercourse be-
came subsumed within the broader contours of criminal assault.98 This trend towards de-sex-
ualizing rape is captured in a controversial utterance of Michel Foucault: ‘When one punishes 
rape, one should be punishing physical violence and nothing but… there is no difference in 
principle between sticking one’s fist into someone’s face or one’s penis into their sex’.99  
By contrast, MacKinnon argues against taking the sex out of rape.100 One of the difficulties 
with the rape-as-violence frame is that it promotes discursive representations of rape in which 
its social and cultural significance as an institutionalized expression of male violence is 
lost.101 Disavowing the sexual dimension of rape also makes it difficult to acknowledge the 
harm of ‘simple rape’ in which physical violence is not present.102 The rape-as-sex paradigm, 
by contrast, emphasizes the intrinsically sexual nature of rape, where ‘sexual’ may variously 
connote: the character of the act (a corporeal encounter involving genitalia or a socially and 
culturally coded expression of sexual desire); the gender-specificity of the legal requirements 
(requiring a departure from the general practice of framing legal wrongs in gender-neutral 
terms); and/or the wider context of gender-asymmetrical power relations of which rape 
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emerges as an important expression. And while the rape-as-violence trope renders rape virtu-
ally indistinguishable from other acts of violence, rape-as-sex inevitably foregrounds the dif-
ficulty of distinguishing rape from ‘just sex’.103  Indeed, MacKinnon contends that the popu-
lar appeal of rape-as-violence is precisely that it puts rape and sex at a convenient distance 
from one another.104 What rape-as-violence does not do is offer an account of why rape de-
serves our special attention, why it should be regarded as distinctly wrongful. By supplying 
the specificity which violence denies, sex facilitates the elevation of rape above other violent 
crimes; it better positions rape as a unique and/or particularly heinous wrong.       
Neither Brownmiller nor MacKinnon, the two key protagonists in the sex-versus-violence de-
bate, explicitly invoke essence to bolster their positions (although both are frequently accused 
of taking an essentialist approach to understandings of sex/gender).105 However, there are nu-
merous examples where essence is directly invoked to privilege one feature of rape over oth-
ers. In the nineteenth century, Lord Emslie asserted that ‘rape has always been essentially a 
crime of violence’.106 In the twenty-first century, Michal Buchhandler-Raphael concludes 
that ‘most scholars today agree that the essential characteristic of rape is nonconsensual sex 
rather than an act of physical violence’.107 This debate over whether sex or violence has the 
greatest explanatory potency exhibits many features of essence talk. What is centrally at issue 
is the nature of rape, what makes it the thing it is and not something else. Moreover, the dis-
course is generally conducted in universalizing terms: the sex-versus-violence debate rarely 
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acknowledges cultural or historical specificity, positing a relation between rape and the privi-
leged feature (sex or violence) which is internal and essential rather than external and contin-
gent. Sometimes the debate presents as an ‘either/or’ dilemma: either rape must be conceived 
in terms of sex or it is a crime of violence. In other contexts, the dual identity of rape as sim-
ultaneously sexual and violent (captured in the term, ‘sexual violence’) is recognized though, 
even here, one feature generally trumps the other. MacKinnon provides a good example of 
the conceptual accommodation of sex and violence by subsuming the latter into the former, 
locating the violence of rape within a frame in which it is already recast as (hetero)sex under-
stood as the eroticization of dominance and submission.108 The violence thus emerges as an 
expression of male sexual desire, a desire fueled by women’s social and sexual subordination. 
Echoing Foucault’s analogy, MacKinnon observes: ‘Assault by a man’s fist is not so different 
from assault by a man’s penis, not because both are violent but because both are sexual.’109 
For MacKinnon, sex is what rape is: its most essential feature and the key to understanding 
rape’s significance and effects. Sex is positioned as the premise upon which the edifice of 
rape and rape law rests.  
Is it possible to conceive rape in terms in which sex does not feature prominently? Interest-
ingly, the etymological origins of rape derive from the Latin rapere meaning ‘to seize or 
carry off’. In most historical accounts, until at least the early middle-ages rape was not specif-
ically equated with forced sex but with the abduction of live things (including women).110 
Early meanings of rape were thus more aligned with violence and theft than sex. Once rape 
began to assume a narrower, predominantly sexual meaning, the broader cultural frame 
through which rape discourse was mediated assumed an increasingly moral character. As late 
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as the 1960s, criminal law scholar, P J Fitzgerald, for whom, as we recall, the essence of rape 
lies in ‘taking sexual liberties’,111 subordinated the violent and sexual dimensions of rape to a 
broader classification of the offence as a ‘crime against morality’.112 As with Foucault, the 
sexual dimension here is almost incidental: what is central about rape is that it violates the 
moral order. Fitzgerald’s classification of rape as essentially moral in character further under-
lines the cultural specificity of perceptions of rape;113 his approach provides a powerful illus-
tration of the way in which essentialist discourse encourages the hegemonic privileging of 
culturally-specific understandings of rape as universally determining, closing off other modes 
of apprehension and presenting rape as a phenomenon which is fixed, ahistorical, and natu-
rally occurring.    
 
PURE ESSENCE 
Essence is sometimes understood as an extract, concentrate, or flavour. This understanding of 
essence emerges with Enlightenment scientificism, etymological investigation placing the 
earliest reference to essence as ‘a substance in concentrated form’ in Robert Boyle’s New Ex-
periments, published in 1660.114 A concentrated substance is undiluted by solvents, usually 
the product of distillation, a process entailing the evaporation and condensation of a liquid 
substance in which extraneous or contaminated elements are removed, leaving a pure, una-
dulterated residue. Academic discourse routinely invokes a metaphor of distillation to signify 
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the reductive re-ordering of data, ideas, and arguments into more concentrated form. The dis-
tilled, purified product of intellectual reflection is often characterized as an essence, as when 
Genevieve Lloyd remarks that ‘deductive ratiocination [is] the essence of [Descartes’] 
method’.115 Sometimes, the distillation metaphor is explicit. For example, Brownmiller pro-
claims pornography as ‘the undiluted essence of anti-female propaganda’.116 Roiphe’s con-
cern that rape has been ‘diluted’117 is similarly reliant on the distillation metaphor, presuppos-
ing a ‘pure’ unadulterated conception of rape threatened by feminist contamination. Pure es-
sence then, like positional essence, functions rhetorically to accord greater authority on a 
point of view by conferring upon it a natural and/ or scientific gloss. 
Related to pure essence is quintessence. This notion also has scientific associations although 
its heritage is far more ancient, deriving from pre-atomic conceptions of the elements in 
which the quinta essentia (pempte ousia in Greek) was the elusive fifth element (after air, 
fire, earth and water) which accounted for the heavenly bodies and permeated all things.118 
From this has emerged the modern linguistic understanding of quintessence as the purest, 
most refined aspect of a thing. Human beings, Margaret Archer observes, ‘are quintessen-
tially evaluative’.119 More pertinent perhaps is Bogart’s assertion that rape is ‘quintessen-
tially… an experience of unwanted sex’.120 The etymological association of quintessence 
with immateriality and heavenly bodies imports into essence an ‘other-worldly’ quality, remi-
niscent of Plato’s theory of forms.  Unlike Aristotle, who argued that essences inhered in 
things themselves, Plato maintained that essences existed in a perfect realm of forms of 
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which real things were mere replicas.121 Such an understanding of essence as an ‘ideal proto-
type’122 reinforces its potency as a regulatory norm.       
One of the advantages of pure essence as a discursive tool is that it can work not simply to 
privilege a particular element of a thing but to isolate it from its surroundings.  Just as distil-
lation separates a substance-in-concentrate from its solvent state, pure essence facilitates the 
dissection of conceptual or normative structures and the detachment of particular elements 
therefrom. The ICTR decision in Musema provides an example: drawing on the previous con-
ceptualization of rape in Akayesu, the Tribunal asserts that ‘the essence of rape is not the par-
ticular details of body parts and objects involved but rather the aggression that is expressed in 
a sexual manner under conditions of coercion’.123 Essence here serves both to privilege an 
understanding of rape as sexual coercion and to distance that understanding from the practi-
cal technicalities of the sexual act so that the precise factual details (more than usually diffi-
cult to prove in cases of mass rape carried out in conflict) become less critical to establishing 
whether or not rape (and, thereby, a crime against humanity) has occurred. Essence allows 
the Court to bypass the potential legal obstacle which these evidentiary difficulties pose by 
excluding them from what is essential to the crime. A similar move is evident in the ECtHR 
judgment in SW v UK124 in which the Court was required to confront the aftermath of judicial 
abolition of the common law immunity protecting husbands from prosecution for raping their 
wives.125 Two applicants, convicted of rapes perpetrated before the House of Lords had re-
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jected the marital immunity, alleged that their convictions violated Art 7(1), the provision re-
garding retrospective laws.126 In determining the convictions did not violate Art 7(1), the EC-
tHR repeatedly appealed to essence to circumvent the problem of retrospectivity. The law, 
the Court asserted, was in a process of ‘evident evolution … consistent with the very essence 
of the offence…’127 It followed that the applicants could reasonably foresee that the immun-
ity might not apply at the time of their actions. Judicial eschewal of the marital immunity, the 
Court declared, was ‘in conformity … with the fundamental objectives of the Convention, the 
very essence of which is respect for human dignity and human freedom’.128 The clear intima-
tion was that the applicants could not rely upon the marital immunity because to do so would 
violate the essence of the Convention. Thus, a radical change in law, judicially enacted and 
retrospectively applied, was re/presented as so consistent with the essence of the offence and 
the substantive values upon which the jurisdiction of the Court was premised as to be a rea-
sonably foreseeable, logically consistent legal extension of existing principle, so minor and 
inexorable as to raise no concern about retrospective application.        
SW shows how pure essence can advance legal change, the distillation metaphor facilitating 
not just the extraction of an essential element from its immediate surroundings but its trans-
position from one context to another. Such an approach is particularly useful when reworking 
concepts and, unsurprisingly, features prominently in law reform where the gist of discarded 
doctrines are often allowed to resurface in attenuated form so that some degree of doctrinal 
purity is retained. It is arguable for example that the old legal notions of ‘carnal knowledge’, 
and later ‘sexual intercourse’, have been legislatively distilled into a concentrated form in 
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which penile penetration emerges as the very essence of rape. This emphasis on penile pene-
tration serves to distinguish rape from other forms of sexual assault but does not preclude an 
expanded reformulation of the offence encompassing penetration of other bodily orifices and, 
inter alia, widening the category of potential victims to include men.  If we grant that to re-
conceive rape as a crime which can be perpetrated on women and men is to reconceive it 
fairly fundamentally, a radical reform is achieved with some continuity of meaning retained 
by transposing a core feature of the old doctrinal framework.   
Is penile penetration the elusive essence we have been seeking? An obvious difficulty here is 
that penile penetration, in and of itself, is not generally regarded as harmful or reprehensi-
ble.129 It cannot therefore account for the wrongfulness of rape. In addition, the jurisdictional 
trend is to move away from penile penetration as an essential feature of rape, in large part to 
facilitate the recasting of the offence in gender-neutral terms. Granted, this is not the ap-
proach in England and Wales. The question of whether rape ought to be redefined to include 
penetration by other instruments (for example, a bottle or fist) was considered by the Home 
Office Review prior to the 2003 reforms; it determined that, notwithstanding gender-neutral-
ity as a key reform principle, rape should continue to be confined to penile penetration.  In 
taking this position, the Review emphasized the centrality of penile penetration to public un-
derstandings of rape, observing: ‘We were uneasy about extending the definition of rape to 
include all forms of sexual penetration. We felt rape was clearly understood by the public as 
an offence that was committed by men on women and on men’ (my italics).130 The subse-
quent legislation, while expanding the scope of rape to include penile penetration of the 
                                                 
129
 Although see (n 83).  
130
 Setting the Boundaries (n 20) para 2.8.4. The Review continues: ‘the offence of penile penetration [i]s of a 
particularly personal kind, it carries risks of pregnancy and disease transmission and should properly be treated 
separately from other penetrative assaults’ (ibid).  
 
29 
mouth, explicitly excluded penetration other than by the penis, creating instead a separate of-
fence of ‘assault by penetration’ to include penetration of the vagina or the anus by ‘a part of 
the body or anything else’.131 In the minds of British legislators then, rape is exclusively 
aligned with penile penetration. This is what sets it apart from other sexual offences.132  
Other jurisdictions take a more expansive approach. The South African Criminal Law (Sex-
ual Offences and Related Matters) Act 2007 adopts an extended definition of rape encom-
passing a number of penetrative acts beyond penile penetration of the vagina, rendering the 
offence fully gender-neutral.133 Ireland takes an odd middle path, combining a traditional 
statutory definition of rape as sexual intercourse between a man and a woman134 with an ad-
ditional definition introduced in 1990 (known as ‘rape under s 4’)135 to include penetration of 
the anus or mouth by the penis or penetration of the vagina by any object held or manipulated 
by another person. In jurisdictions which have forsworn the rape nomenclature, the signifi-
cance of penetration has been weakened further. Indeed, Canada’s law of sexual assault 
makes no formal categorical distinction between sexual touching and full-blown inter-
course.136 By contrast, penetration (though not necessarily penile) continues to occupy a priv-
ileged position in Australia, even in those states which have adopted gender-neutral sobri-
quets such as ‘sexual assault’ (New South Wales) or ‘sexual intercourse without consent’ 
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(Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory).137 In Western Australia the designated 
term is ‘sexual penetration without consent’.138 The notion of penetration is quite expansive, 
encompassing a range of bodily orifices and penetrating instruments.  
The question which inevitably arises is why retain the anchor of penetration at all? Certainly, 
the more rape is removed from the heterosexual archetype of penile-vaginal penetration, the 
more difficult it is to comprehend the continued centrality of penetration in the conceptual 
framework. The widespread endorsement of sexual autonomy as the normative keystone for 
criminalization139 puts further distance between rape and penetration as autonomy places 
greater emphasis on the violation of the victim’s will or her denial of choice than the physical 
details of the encounter.140 The retreat from penetration is also reflective of changing cultural 
as well as legal understandings of rape. In England and Wales, ‘male rape’ was not formally 
recognized until the closing decade of the last century.141 Recognizing male rape not only ef-
fects a formal break between rape and heterosexuality but excises reproductive considerations 
from the discursive frame. This perhaps is the most radical move of all because it disrupts 
centuries of association between rape and the regulation of female generativity. It is widely 
recognized that in its earliest historical manifestations, rape was conceived as a means of pro-
tecting men’s property in women’s bodies and the fruits thereof.142 The wrong of rape lay not 
in the violation of a woman’s will but in the unlawful appropriation of a woman’s chastity, 
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viewed as a ‘dimension of property or inheritance’.143 We have seen how, in early Roman 
law, raptus was not regarded as a distinctly sexual wrong but as a form of theft or abduc-
tion.144 Women’s value lay in their marriageability and reproductive promise, and rape func-
tioned as a deeply embedded aspect of a legal framework which protected (male) property 
rights.  
This brief appeal to history highlights once again the cultural contingency of rape, the way in 
which it takes its form and substance from the broader network of values and relations, atti-
tudes and institutions, which shape social life. It enables us to understand both the historical 
centrality of heterosexuality in rape law and its increasing marginalization in an era in which 
rape is thought to be less about gender and more about sex.  It is in this context that we can 
best apprehend the retention of penetration, albeit in expanded, gender-neutral form, in most 
modern rape laws. Penetration works here to pin down the sexual dimension of rape; it is po-
sitioned as quintessentially expressive of what sex is. At the same time, and in the context of 
an ongoing transformation in cultural perceptions of sexual identity, expression, and rela-
tions, this conflation of sex with penetration, and indeed the construction of sex as something 
that one person does to another, assumes an increasingly arbitrary and tendentious character. 
Because penetration has long exercised a historical grip on our apprehension of what sex is, it 
seems difficult to envisage an understanding of rape without it.  Yet, once the link between 
rape and heterosexuality is formally severed, once a concern with the consequences of female 
generativity falls out of focus, we can envisage an understanding of rape or sexual miscon-
duct in which penetration is no longer a central feature.   
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A final common understanding of essence is linked to notions of what is real. To get to the 
essence of something is to get to what it really is. In philosophical discourse, ‘real essence’ is 
primarily associated with Locke's distinction between ‘real’ and ‘nominal’ essence. The real 
essence of a thing, Locke argued, is its actual internal constitution and the cause or explana-
tion of its observable qualities.145 By contrast, nominal essence is our abstract idea of some-
thing, based on our sensory perceptions and comprising the features or characteristics we se-
lect to signify it.  Locke maintained that real essence is largely unknowable, our sensory limi-
tations allowing us to apprehend it only in limited contexts such as mathematics. Our defini-
tions, our accounts of what things are, may well call upon essence but it is nominal rather 
than real essence which is being invoked.  
Real essence emerges again in classical social theory, this time in the idea of a real but elu-
sive essence which lurks beneath or behind the appearance of things. Marx, in particular, dis-
tinguished between the essential or 'real relations' underpinning capitalist production and the 
appearance or 'phenomenal forms' of capitalist social relations.146 This conception of essence/ 
appearance has also been deployed in feminist standpoint theory.147 Nancy Hartsock’s argu-
ment, that women by virtue of their structural position under patriarchy have access to a par-
ticular, epistemologically privileged vantage point which better apprehends the reality of pa-
triarchal social relations, is predicated on the idea of an essential reality which patriarchal 
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ideology conceals.148 MacKinnon’s work can also be read in this way. Her core assertion that 
‘the social relation between the sexes is organized so that men may dominate and women 
must submit and this relation is sexual – is in fact sex’149 is premised on the idea that what 
appears as natural (hetero)sexual desire is but a phenomenal expression of the male appropri-
ation of female sexuality.150 MacKinnon repeatedly asserts that the notion of sexuality she in-
vokes is not essentialist. Discussing her use of sex categories, she observes: ‘Male is a social 
and political concept not a biological attribute, having nothing whatever to do with inherency, 
pre-existence, nature, essence, inevitability…’151 However, what this comment reveals is that 
the conception of essence MacKinnon has in mind has more in common with Aristotle than 
Marx. Marx would not deny that capitalism is socially constructed; indeed, at the heart of 
Marx’s historical materialism is precisely an emphasis upon the historical contingency of ar-
rangements which appear natural and inevitable. What is essential within a Marxian frame is 
the lived reality of everyday lives, essential in the sense of being real within the fabric of cap-
italist social relations though not naturally determining or inherent in all social and economic 
arrangements.  
What is real here is closely aligned with what is true. Essence is understood to be expressive 
of an actual, usually hidden, truth, whether about capitalism, patriarchy, or human nature. Is 
there an inner truth or reality of rape to be discovered? Consider Brownmiller’s famous asser-
tion that rape is “nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which all 
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men keep all women in a state of fear’.152  Here Brownmiller invites us to ‘accept as basic 
truth that rape is not a crime of irrational, impulsive, uncontrollable lust but … a deliberate 
hostile violent act of degradation and possession … designed to intimidate and inspire 
fear…’.153 Brownmiller effectively reconfigures rape from an individual, aberrant act to a po-
litical weapon which sustains male dominance. What appears as capricious and one-off is in 
fact calculated and systemic; what seems to be the primary driver – sexual desire – is merely 
the tool, the method – collectively deployed to quite different ends. Brownmiller is attributing 
a systemic logic to rape which, while not readily apparent, nevertheless reflects the underly-
ing reality of rape as a social institution. Real essence is a way of getting at this systematicity, 
the group-based and/or structural features of rape, facilitating a discourse in which rape can 
be apprehended other than as 'an accident of private history'.154 Real essence also provides an 
account of rape’s origins and purposes.  According to Brownmiller, the simple anatomy of 
copulation created an opportunity for force which men could not resist: ‘When men discov-
ered they could rape, they proceeded to do it’ so that, over time ‘rape became not only a male 
prerogative, but man’s basic weapon of force over woman’.155 Here we have a story of ori-
gins in which a fact of biology becomes ideologically overlain. It serves both as an explana-
tion of rape – what rape is – and an account of how and why rape emerged, its causal origins 
or foundations. This is why Brownmiller’s analysis is widely regarded as essentialist.   
Louise du Toit also invokes an essential reality underpinning the appearance of rape. She ar-
gues that the ‘true nature’156 of rape is occluded by a patriarchal symbolic framework which 
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simultaneously denies the possibility of rape as it is actually experienced. Highlighting a fis-
sure between a predominant conception of rape as a violation of ownership rights over the 
body157 and phenomenological accounts in which rape emerges as the utter devastation of 
selfhood, du Toit maintains that it is precisely the fragile and ambiguous status of female sub-
jectivity within the Western symbolic order which renders the ‘essential damage of rape’158 
so difficult to apprehend. She offers the example of ‘simple rape’, rape with no accompany-
ing physical trauma. Within a property model, du Toit explains, the harm of simple rape 
seems relatively trivial, no more than unauthorized usage. In the absence of physical injury, 
the property (body) has been ill-used but not damaged.159 By contrast, and drawing on the ac-
counts of rape victims themselves, du Toit reveals the ‘true nature’ of rape – including simple 
rape – as ‘the violent erasure of a woman victim’s sexual subjectivity’,160 a violence and de-
struction which is no less real because it is concealed.  
Again, it is important to stress that du Toit’s analysis is not essentialist in the sense of ascrib-
ing certain necessary, universally shared attributes to the rape experience (necessary es-
sence); nor is she privileging some aspects of that experience over others in terms of im-
portance (positional essence) or degree of concentration (pure essence). Rather, by excavat-
ing the ‘essential damage’ of rape, she is seeking to articulate the truth or reality of rape as 
experienced by women within the framework of a symbolic order in which that truth or real-
ity is denied. Far from fixing the meaning of rape in an eternal truth, du Toit’s object is dis-
rupt the symbolic order which denies women full sexual subjectivity and renders rape such a 
devastating experience. She seeks to imagine a world in which ‘rape becomes ridiculous’161 
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because it can no longer function as an attack on women’s selfhood; its cause for being, for 
becoming, is thus extinguished.162 
Note here how essence relates to cause. The essential harm of rape – understood as the eras-
ure of women’s subjectivity – is also its cause or explanation; rape occurs precisely because 
‘it serves to affirm the rapist’s sense of masculine self and his sense of having a place in the 
world through a sharp and violent demarcation of his identity from the feminine’163; this is 
rape’s meaning or ‘logic’.164 Just as the expropriation of labour/sex is both the reality and 
root cause (explanation) of capitalism/patriarchy, so is the denial/destruction of female self-
hood the reality and root cause of rape within a patriarchal symbolic order.165 Revealing that 
essential reality becomes a critical step towards resisting its effects.  
One can relate such notions of essence as cause and/or origins to Witt’s conception of ‘indi-
vidual essentialism’.166 Witt distinguishes two kinds of individual essentialism: uniessential-
ism, in which essence is understood in terms of the unity and organization of material parts to 
make a functional whole (essence as functional properties), and identity essentialism which 
Witt associates with Saul Kripke’s work locating (an idea of) essence in the material origins 
of things.167 While the mapping is far from exact, one does see – in Brownmiller’s analysis in 
particular – an account of rape as intimidation which is both an account of causal being in 
terms of function (why rape is) and causal becoming (how rape is engendered). Applying 
Witt’s understanding of essence as causal being (what she calls ‘uniessence’),168 it is that 
rape-functional property – rape enables intimidation - which is essential to rape, which makes 
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it what it is and explains why it is (as opposed to a random encounter of body parts).  Inter-
estingly too, such a functional properties approach avoids the kind of essentialism – usually 
associated with necessary essence – in which a thing must be understood in terms of neces-
sary properties which endure through time and change. As Witt explains, functional proper-
ties are relational not intrinsic: ‘the functional properties of artifacts are always enmeshed in 
a broad social context of use’.169 They also have a ‘normative dimension: ‘the function speci-
fies what the object ought to do, not simply what it does’.170 Returning to du Toit, her analy-
sis locates rape – its function, operations, and objectives – within a particular socio-symbolic 
context in which the true nature or essence or rape can be revealed; but it is a contingent truth 
which both accommodates the social construction of rape while affirming its reality as a felt 
experience.        
Similarly, accounts of rape which focus on its historic origins resonate, however crudely, 
with Kripke’s identity essentialism, with the notion that the essence of rape somehow derives 
from where and what it has originated.171 What makes rape really rape is the thin but un-
breakable thread connecting its past iterations with present apprehensions. Thus, Brownmil-
ler’s account of rape’s origins in an anatomical accident exploited by men, locates the es-
sence of rape in penile penetration - ‘the locking together of two separate parts, penis into 
vagina’172 – but, crucially understood as an act men perform upon women, creating the op-
portunity for force. By contrast, du Toit points out that this very understanding of sex as 
men’s use (whether consensually or otherwise) of women’s bodies is itself a construction of 
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the patriarchal symbolic order.173 To put it another way, it is only within a cultural frame in 
which women’s sexual subjectivity is already rendered fragile and/or limited, in which, aptly 
expressed by MacKinnon  ‘man fucks woman; subject-verb-object’,174 that such a one-sided 
conception of sexual intercourse is intelligible.  
To sum up, both du Toit and Brownmiller draw, explicitly in Du Toit’s case, implicitly in 
Brownmiller’s, on notions of essence to offer an account of the reality of rape, a reality which 
is not self-evident but needs to be revealed. Du Toit’s account is in my view more successful 
in demonstrating that rape has a systemic logic producing a necessary harm while simultane-
ously acknowledging its socio-symbolic construction. Du Toit thus avoids (Brownmiller ar-
guably less so) an invocation of rape as natural and fixed; she is open to an understanding of 
essence which accommodates the social and variable nature of rape over time and space. 
There is in Du Toit’s analysis a real essence to rape – a unity to the assemblage of its parts 
which is phenomenologically revealed in its function and effects - but only within the social 
context of its use, only in relation to the symbolic world in which (hetero)sex is currently 
configured. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
CONCLUSION 
This article has critically explored the idea that rape has an essence. What it reveals is that it 
has not. While multiple notions of essence structure and infuse rape discourse, it is difficult to 
identify or defend an ‘essence’ of rape. Invoking an ordinary language approach to concep-
tual interrogation, I posited four inter-related understandings of essence – necessary, posi-
tional, pure, and real - each of which captures a way in which essence is discursively utilized. 
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Engaging these different understandings of essence to probe central questions regarding the 
nature, scope and content of rape has been illuminating. Looking at rape in terms of essential 
properties has shown how difficult it is satisfactorily to pinpoint any necessary features of 
rape, neither consent nor coercion, surely the most plausible candidates in this regard, prov-
ing sufficiently stable or determinate to qualify as features with which rape law cannot dis-
pense. Exploring how essence hierarchically positions certain features of a thing illuminates 
the operation of the ‘real rape’ stereotype not as definitional, but as discursively privileging. 
Positional essence also throws fresh light on the sex-versus-violence debate in rape theory by 
exposing how, as particular understandings of rape compete for primacy, their cultural and 
situational specificity becomes submerged. Appeals to purity in rape discourse are shown to 
be closely associated with ideas of essence, and explain, inter alia, the continued reliance on 
(penile) penetration to anchor rape law long after the historical link between rape and the reg-
ulation of female generativity has been formally severed. Finally, this analysis has mapped a 
discursive alignment between essence and appeals to the truth or reality of rape. Essence 
works in two main ways here, either to tie rape to an account of its origins/cause, or to navi-
gate (and explain) the tension between formal articulations of rape and experience-based, 
phenomenological accounts. In both contexts, the ‘reality’ of rape, its material, corporeal, and 
sex(ually)-specific aspects, are the main focus of essence-driven analyses, although, as the 
discussion of du Toit’s work, in particular, reveals, such engagements do not require a com-
mitment to a conception of rape which transcends the historical and cultural conditions ren-
dering it intelligible.  
Far from revealing an essential core, rape is seen to be a remarkably fluid concept, evolving 
and adapting culturally and historically. We should not, then, be surprised – or concerned – to 
learn that contemporary ideas of rape are changing or that multiple notions of rape co-exist 
40 
simultaneously in public discourse.  Drawing on WB Gallie’s seminal article,175 Eric Reitan 
argues that rape is an ‘essentially contested concept’, that is, a concept which, because of its 
evaluative, indeed emotive, qualities, is inherently contestable.176 Essentially contested con-
cepts are generally utilized appraisively (consider, for example, concepts like art or democ-
racy) so that disagreements about definition are more than usually contentious: what presents 
as an analytical dispute is in fact a normative conflict over the appropriate designation of a 
morally loaded term. Reitan’s argument goes some way to explain why public discourse 
around rape is so frustratingly unproductive. The essential contestedness of rape generates 
endless disputes which take the form of concern about its proper definition and scope but ac-
tually express deeply conflicting views about the moral/political character of particular forms 
of sexual interaction and expression.   
For example, reflecting on R v Bree,177 a Court of Appeal case which considered the issue of 
a drunken victim’s capacity to consent to sexual intercourse, Gittos laments ‘the criminal ad-
judication of a drunken regrettable incident between two young people…unfortunately the 
sort of encounter which must happen regularly at campuses up and down the country’.178 It is 
the sheer normality of such encounters which, for Gittos, takes them outside the scope of 
rape, a term he reserves for extreme acts of sexual aberration, gauged from a culturally mas-
culine perspective of what looks like ‘normal’ sex. Because he views rape as exceptional, 
out-of-the-ordinary sexual behavior, Gittos wants to contain the term, as far as possible, 
within traditional parameters. However, it is the parameters themselves, not the gender rela-
tions they express, which Gittos invokes, thereby deflecting attention away from the prob-
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lematic assumptions about male and female sexuality which underpin such traditional articu-
lations. Drawing again on Reitan’s analysis, Gittos is ‘seeking to silence some moral perspec-
tives [feminist ones] “by definition”’.179  
An important feature of essentially contested concepts is that it is their nature to host contes-
tation. Therefore, there is nothing wrong with seeking to extend their parameters. As Reitan 
puts it, ‘extending the boundaries of [an essentially contestable] concept is part of the proper 
use of the term’.180 Because essentially contested concepts function primarily as a vehicle for 
making evaluative judgments, multiple, competing concepts come into play in any discursive 
encounter. In this context, the pull exerted by ideologically privileged conceptions is always 
strong. However, if we recognize the essential contestability of rape, we should resist the ide-
ological impetus to contain the concept and accept that questions of definition and delineation 
are properly open to challenge.   
This does not open the concept of rape to a free-for-all. An additional feature of essentially 
contested concepts is that, while different definitions may compete, it is generally possible to 
identify some exemplars or paradigms which everyone agrees fall within the scope of the 
concept, however defined. Reitan cites here the example of ‘a stranger using physical force to 
overpower and vaginally penetrate a resisting woman’,181 easily recognizable as the ‘real 
rape’ stereotype. Is this essence reasserting itself? Reitan insists not. This ‘standard para-
digm’ he argues (correlating historically with the ancient notion of rape as the carrying off of 
livestock) does not prescribe the minimum necessary features of rape (necessary essence) alt-
hough it may well, by virtue of the agreement it inspires, contain some feature(s) which most 
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people regard as essential.182 What remains contentious is which feature of the standard para-
digm is essential in this sense: some might point to force, others to vaginal penetration, and, 
still others to the objectification and/or dehumanization of the victim which the crime occa-
sions.183 This latter aspect, of course, is not a recognized feature of rape historically. For too 
long rape and rape law functioned to protect men’s rights of sexual access to women, not to 
protect or empower women themselves. It is feminist re-definitions of rape, as Reitan points 
out, which have challenged such patriarchal conceptions by drawing directly upon women’s 
perspectives and experiences. It follows that new feminist insights on rape do not so much 
trouble the standard paradigm as view it through a different lens, bringing into focus ele-
ments, such as the erasure of female subjectivity, which have hitherto been obscured. 
The ‘real rape’ stereotype, then, is not an essence, at least not in the necessary sense. How-
ever, because it contains at least one element which virtually all agree is rape-indicative (al-
beit in the context of significant disagreement about which element this might be) it contin-
ues to figure prominently in discursive engagement. In other words, the persistence of the 
real rape stereotype is not purely historical; it is nevertheless pernicious, at least in its opera-
tion, because it continues to facilitate the ideological foregrounding of a rape imaginary de-
rived from and too often supportive of male privilege. Acknowledging the ‘essential contest-
edness’ of rape helps to counter such pernicious effects by exposing and legitimating norma-
tive conflict.  
For the analytical philosopher, this becomes a problem of conflict resolution, fueling enquir-
ies into which norms, values or interests are, or ought to be, at the heart of rape law. Such en-
gagements are of more than just philosophical significance. Grounding rape in an agreed nor-
mative framework can aid the resolution of pressing boundary disputes: for example, should 
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sex induced by fraud fall within or without the legal contours of the offence? Autonomy-
based arguments generally pull rape in the direction of inclusion here.184 However, the pro-
spect of extending rape to encompass rape-by-deception may also offer a reason for rejecting 
sexual autonomy as the normative lynchpin of rape law because it casts the conceptual net 
more widely than some might like.185 This of course highlights the obvious difficulty of how 
to secure normative agreement, how to ground a coherent, principle-based account of rape ca-
pable of resisting repeated challenge. Can the sound application of techniques of moral rea-
soning yield a satisfactory answer to the problems we have been canvassing?  
I would argue against the representation of rape discourse purely as a site of moral conflict. 
Stressing cultural and historical specificity has exposed rape as inessential, taking different 
forms and meanings over time and space, and highlighting a need to apprehend it in context, 
to recognize rape as a socially constructed, culturally produced set of judgments about sexual 
wrongdoing, embedded in networks of values, attitudes and relations which are, inter alia, 
gendered. Abstract reasoning around competing moral values too often leads to the excision 
of concepts from their context, and although this does not necessarily follow – it is possible, 
for example, to advocate a conception of rape law premised on sexual autonomy while fully 
recognizing this as expressive of distinctly modern ideas about sex and sexual behavior - the 
accompanying inclination to view legal developments teleologically ‘as the gradual working 
out of an underlying principle’,186 does tend to foster universalized accounts in which princi-
ples inexorably (re)assert themselves. A further difficulty with the neglect of context is that it 
diverts attention away from the conditions which give rise to a particular perception of the is-
sue; as Farmer observes, the question of how and why an issue comes to be framed in the 
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terms that it does.187 For Farmer this requires an approach which historicizes normative theo-
rizing but also, I would argue, politicizes it. I invoke here not an idea of politics in the con-
ventional sense but rather the philosophical notion of ‘the political’ which locates power at 
the heart of knowledge production and meaning-making.188  Once we accept that knowledge 
is at least in part mediated by power relations, we cannot avoid viewing rape and the dis-
course surrounding it as politically imbued. The sensibilities and rationalities which shape 
and animate rape debate are situated within ‘a hegemonic field of contestable interpretations 
and values’,189 in which our very apprehension of the ‘problem of rape’ is the focus of pro-
found political disagreement over the role and scope of law in regulating sexual encounters. 
For some, for example, Gittos, the political vision underpinning his critique of modern rape 
law is staunchly libertarian, grounded in an individualist conception of society blind to social 
relations of power (including gender) and adamantly resistant to further state encroachment 
on the sphere of sexual intimacy.190 For others, for example, MacKinnon and indeed most 
feminists, rape is a key site of gender inequality, a critical focus of resistance to patriarchal 
power/male dominance. This is also a politics which actively engages the state in combatting 
gendered power asymmetries, including in the sphere of sexuality.  
The politics of rape are inevitably more intense at a time when notions of sex and sexuality 
are being radically remade. Rape discourse has become a channel for debating what kinds of 
socio-sexual relations we are trying to promote or discourage, and the role law should play in 
this regard. Approaching rape through an agonistic rather than consensus-seeking paradigm 
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gets at this critical dimension of contemporary rape politics while encouraging an apprehen-
sion of rape through its discursive articulations, which are in turn entangled in a complex, 
historically entrenched network of social relations, practices, and beliefs.   
Understanding, interrogating and reconceiving rape is part of a political process of collec-
tively recalibrating sexual norms in the context of significant change in women’s social, eco-
nomic and political status, empowering and impelling calls upon law to proscribe acts of sex-
ual misconduct which, in earlier times, would not have been widely viewed as within the 
proper reach of criminal law. It is for this reason that what Gavey describes as the ‘cultural 
scaffolding of rape’191, understood as the ‘discourses of sex and gender that produce forms of 
heterosex that set up the pre-conditions for rape – women’s passive acquiescing (a)sexuality 
and men’s forthright, urgent, pursuit of sexual “release192 is, on the one hand, under unprece-
dented threat, and on the other, relentlessly reasserting itself. The agonistic politics of rape 
discourse occupies tricky and hazardous territory - difficult to navigate and with a great deal 
at stake. My purpose here has been to show that thinking about rape in terms of essence does 
not help effective navigation and, more often than not, impedes rather than advances a richer 
understanding of what everyone acknowledges are complex and pressing concerns. A first 
step to crafting just solutions to the problem of rape in contemporary society is surely to rec-
ognize its political nature; to apprehend its contentiousness in the context of the wholesale 
disruption of patterns of power and privilege, legally enshrined for centuries. Viewed in this 
way, rape law emerges not, as Rubenfeld asserts, as ‘a body of law in search of a principle’193 
but as a field of struggle in which principle yields to politics and law to power.  
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